ICG: Zim democratic transition remains at risk

The Zimbabwe Independent – ZIMBABWE is facing political and security risks which might scuttle the current transition, the International Crisis Group (ICG), a global organisation led by retired statesmen, has said. In its latest report titled Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition, the ICG said the country’s transition from dictatorship to democracy was bedevilled by serious “political and security risks”.

“Despite initial scepticism, Zimbabwe’s year-old unity government has achievements to its credit, but the democratic transition remains at risk, especially from hard-line security officials –– President Robert Mugabe’s last reliable supporters,” the report says.

ICG Africa Programme Director François Grignon said the military posed the greatest threat to transition.

“As Zimbabwe enters its second year under a unity government, the challenges to democratic transformation are in sharp focus,” Grignon said.

“The military leadership and other Mugabe loyalists in Zanu PF are using their symbiotic relationship with the state apparatus to exercise veto power over the transition. A mature political system must develop, so Zanu PF and the MDC engage as both competitors in politics and partners in government.”

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Somalia: ICG should avoid distortions

By Faizal Mohamud

The international Crisis Group (ICG) released a Policy Briefing on Puntland State of Somalia entitled “Somalia: the Trouble with Puntland”, warning that instability, corruption, and poor governance “could lead to Puntland’s disintegration or overthrow by an underground militant Islamist movement”. But the Brussels-based think-tank fails to substantiate its conclusions, argues Somali journalist.

The report‎ contains facts that are half-truths and flaunt with contradicting conclusions [1] that could easily instigate clan-based violence, rivalry and political disintegration for the benefit of rival regional administration, it has long advocated for. Such a prejudiced and irresponsible report is meant to dent the confidence of Puntlanders towards the administration, and damage the image of its respective leadership.

It must be noted that some of the problems cited in the report, i.e. corruption, nepotism and poor governance, have been underlying problems since the post independence era and still remain a matter of concern for the greater Somalia, thus cannot be attributed to a government which has been working for just few months. Even the regional administrations, governments, and international agencies engaged to salvage the situation in Somalia have been marred by these social illnesses and there is a very little that could be done until such time whereby democratic, stable and accountable government is established.

But what concerns me much in the report are the gross distortion of facts which in many ways are provocative and deceptive geared to abort the new plan to improve democracy and establish multiparty system in Punland. It also impairs their other healthy recommendations such as the formation of independent electoral and anti-corruption commissions to ensure the future sturdiness of the government system.

Although some of the recommendations are of the same tone with the public expectations from the new administration which came to power in January as reformist, all other suggestions embodied in the report are threat to its very existence and will infuriate its people. The call for Puntland to start serious talks with Somaliland to seek the final status of Sool and Sanaag regions or resort to international arbitration if necessary are issues that will not be well taken by the people at this right moment, as such there needs to be another approach without rushing into it while other more valid outstanding issues are at stake right now.

Raising doubts in “the status and ownership” of Sool and Sanaag would undermine its legitimacy and would cause the people of those regions to boycott the administration. Somaliland’s occupation of Las’anod has already damaged the confidence of the people towards the regime, who demand fast action. This fact is acknowledged by ICG itself. ” Clan leaders said Somaliland’s forcible seizure of Laas Canood and Puntland’s alleged failure to “lift a finger” to challenge the “occupation” brought home their “powerlessness”, ICG reported ( see P.10)

It is to be noted here that ICG have long campaigned for the independence of Somaliland from the rest of Somalia.[2] That advocacy was influenced by experts, who, as ICG’s researchers, advocated for Somaliland’s long battle for recognition. Many Somali analysts blame the researches made by ICG itself as having contributed to the very notion that Somaliland has a legitimate reason to succeed from the greater Somalia, a conclusion which in one way or the other contributed to the problems in Sool and Sanag questions.

The personalities who have made this research and campaigned for the international recognition of Somaliland did not base their works on intellectual ethics but on marital affiliations to Somaliland. [3].  I have made comments on few remarks in the report, hoping that many concerned readers will be able to analyze the report thoroughly.

ICG’s attribution of Puntland insecurity and political tension to ” a collapse of the intra-clan cohesion and pan-Darood solidarity” (P.1), is totally baseless, and far from the reality of clan relations in Somalia, particularly in Puntland. As the saying goes “Blood is thicker than water”, the clan-cohesion remains strong in Puntland unthreatened by political differences. Notably, it was this blood-relation that saved the region from the ruins of the civil war before Puntland came into existence in 1998.

In addition, the aim behind the establishment of Puntland was not pan-Daroodism, had it been so, the other Darood clans in Galgadud region would have been included in the process. However, besides their clan-relation, the clans formed Puntland State hence politically and geographically interlinked.

To spark clan rivalry, the think-tank has gone beyond this falsehood by underestimating two clans, unfoundedly claiming that ” the Warsangeli and the Dhulbahante, numerically disadvantaged and historically reliant on the Majerten for protection, appeared on the whole supportive of the Puntland project”P.3.

There is no census on clan numbers; therefore the assumption on numerical disadvantage is baseless. The fact that some clans are numerically dominant doesn’t mean others are disadvantaged. More over, the claim of historical reliance of these two clans on Majerteen for protection is groundless, and could only be contempt for these respective clans. ICG ignores or may not know the fact that these two clans made up the largest portion of Puntland’s security forces- Darawish, and the important role they had played in the independence struggle [4].

To consolidate its trial of incitement and provocation, the Crisis-body states ” despite widespread misgivings in Sool and Sanaag and claims of strong-arm tactics by Yusuf [Puntland’s first president] to co-opt recalcitrant leaders, participants accepted the outcome. Elders from the two clans knew the consequences of challenging the SSDF”.

ICG displays here that Puntland was formed under fear and apprehension rather than consent despite its call for Puntland to return to its consensual style system, only to contradict its earlier assertion “ the Majerten and their Harti clan cousins, the Warsangeli and Dhulbahante, believed inaction would make them vulnerable. Their conclusion was that they needed to act in unison to secure their interests and avoid being swept under in what was seen as a vicious clan struggle for territory and power” P.2

The Crisis Group only mentions SSDF in the establishment of Puntland while other factions participated in the process, because it intends to project Puntland State as Majerten initiative as it divides Puntlanders as Majertens and non-majertens, a norm used by ICG-client, Somaliland as “propaganda campaign” as again acknowledged by ICG, saying “ an old name often viewed as offensive by the Majerten, “Majertenia”, was used to describe Puntland. The state radio, Radio Hargeysa, continues to use this name” P.3.

“ The campaign to rally the Isimada (clan elders) for a purpose to curb down an autonomous pan-Harti regional state was driven by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)” it says without mentioning the SNDU faction of Ali Ismail Abdi Giir which was part of the process at its infancy. SNDU leader signed alongside Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed the Mudug Agreement with late-general Mohamed Farah Aideed which ended the conflict in the region.

The ICG executive committee should revise its works; remove bogus assertions to improve its tarnished image as defamatory accounts would not solve problems if not further alleviate them. They should not allow individuals to abuse their assignment as analysts to fabricate stories in order to foment political tension in peaceful region, struggling to deal with security challenges in a country revaged by civil war.

Intelligent writers, analysts, journalists and any concerned partners should not rely on these misrepresentations, and therefore check with other reasonable sources to avoid the same pitfalls.

The writer is a Somali journalist, who long covered the Somali issues, the Horn of Africa  and could be reached at [email protected]

[1] Liban Ahmed, Somalia: Inaccuracies and omissions in ICG report on Puntland, Garowe Online, 14/08/09
[2] ICG, Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership, Africa Report N°110.
[3] Said A. Saryan, Nomination of Somalia’s secessionist’s Poster Boy, Matt Bryden, to Somalia’s UN Monitoring Group Awdal News Network, July 20, 2008
[4] Dhulbahantes, for example, are known for their decisive support to Somalia’s anti-colonial warrior, Sayid Mohamed Abdullah Hassan and his command centre, Taleh, is their present-day territory. They are also admired for their noble role in Somali literature as distinguished poets hail from the clan, so are their Warsangali cousins.

Source : Garowe Online