Thabo Mbeki, the disgraced former president of South Africa and the SADC-anointed mediator in the Zimbabwe crisis spent four days last week in Harare, Zimbabwe’s capital, wrestling with Robert Mugabe’s brittle ego to save the power-sharing deal. He failed.
Failure to reach an agreement is a serious indictment on Mbeki’s ability to produce favourable political results when it matters most. He is simply not a tough negotiator.
Most political analysts agree that events leading to Mbeki’s ouster deflated his ego, and by the time a High Court judge pronounced his guilt of manipulating the process to trash Jacob Zuma, Mr. Mbeki was all too eager to surrender. If he could not handle Jacob Zuma, walking into the furnace of Zimbabwe’s deadly political courtyard is what they call in American wrestling a high risk manoeuvre, especially if one’s political reputation is already under scrutiny.
The three parties in Zimbabwe’s political wild fire are all tough nuts to crack, and anyone who approaches them with ecumenical overtones is bound to fail.
Robert Mugabe is single-handedly credited with destroying one of the biggest political brand names in Africa – Joshua Nkomo and his Patriotic Front – Zimbabwe African People’s Union PF- ZAPU. In December 1987, Joshua Nkomo ceded his political constituency to a grinning Mugabe who promptly erased the ZAPU logo and swallowed the entire national PF-ZAPU structure. A token gesture of vice-presidential posts and meaningless Home Affairs ministerial appointments is what Nkomo managed to salvage to pacify his hapless supporters.
Incidentally, current power-sharing talks have evoked ghosts of the
1987 Unity Accord where so-called PF-ZAPU representatives in Mugabe’s current political arrangement fear for their future. Vice president John Msika, John Nkomo, Simon Khaya-Moyo, Sithembiso Nyoni, Angeline Masuku and Sikhanyiso Ndlovu are alleged to be insisting that a new power sharing deal should respect the 1987 Unity Accord for their inclusion in critical security ministries. Others like Enos Nkala, Dumiso Dabengwa, Mabhena, and Edward Ndlovu had already seen the light and abandoned Mugabe’s gluttonous ZANU-pf. It is unlikely that Thabo Mbeki has the depth and canny ability to handle such complexities.
On the other hand, Morgan Tsvangirayi is a seasoned campaigner for political rights. Between 1980 and now, out of the ten or so individuals who have tried unsuccessfully to challenge Mugabe’s hegemonic tyranny, Tsvangirayi can be said to be the most successful. The list of Mugabe’s political scalps includes, as indicated above, Joshua Nkomo, the late Ndabaningi Sithole, and the late Justice Dumbutshena, Edgar Tekere, Margaret Dongo, the late Kempton Makamure and Wurayayi Zembe. Others are too insignificant for inclusion in this treatise.
Tsvangirayi stands out prominent, in that in all subsequent Presidential and Parliamentary elections since 2000, his Movement for Democratic Change can be said to have won had it not been for Mugabe’s chicanery. Thus Mbeki has to contend with a man who has brought Mugabe to the negotiating table. In more ways than one, the 29 March 2008 electoral majority proved that Tsvangirayi, not Mugabe, should be head of class.
It is said Thabo Mbeki is an intellectual of world acclaim, but he is certainly not in the orbit of Professor Arthur Mutambara, head of the other MDC formation. Many defeatists had predicted that Mutambara would collapse before crossing the finishing line, but as you read this article; his formation is a major king-maker in the New House of Assembly.
Mutambara has survived a torrent of infectious criticism and personal insults mainly from Tsvangirayi’s legion of global extremists whose only knowledge of democracy is to spell the word. In fact, had Tsvangirayi acceded to Mutambara’s pre-29 March overtures for electoral collaboration, Mugabe’s political constituency would now have shrunk to near insignificance. Mutambara’s ability to balance intellectual rational and political sense has made him a survivor, and it is hard to even perceive how Mbeki would have gotten through Tsvangirayi without Mutambara’s mediation.
And so if Mbeki had been as good as SADC would have make us believe, he would have dismissed Mugabe’s claim to authority with contempt. In simple terms, he should have reminded Mugabe that losing a not so free and fair election in March, a whittled Parliamentary majority and shameful reputation cannot give a man competitive advantage in political negotiations.
Unfortunately, Mbeki, who will have to be eternally grateful to former defence minister Mosiuoa Lekota for hedging his political career, had no guts and so Mugabe still has the leeway to play big man, much to the chagrin of bemused Zimbabweans. – Ghana News
By Rejoice Ngwenya, Harare, Zimbabwe: [Regular columnist for www.AfricanLiberty.org. He heads the reformist group, Coalition for Market and Liberal Solutions in Harare, Zimbabwe.]
A visionary South African foreign policy would take advantage of the enormous political capital of its global statesman primus inter pares, Nelson Mandela, along with the strengths of South Africa’s political and racial diversity, the lessons of its own negotiation and transformation process, good and bad, and sophistication and muscle of South Africa’s economy, 40% of sub-Saharan Africa’s total. Its domestic political and economic success would offer a platform and resource for all of Africa, allowing brave and bold foreign-policy thinking that is fresh and independent, offering a uniquely African democratic development model.
Yet today what could have been – and might still be – has to be contextualised within the damage done by the current regime to South Africa’s foreign-policy credibility and impact.
President Thabo Mbeki is supposed to be the great strategist, the Machiavelli of negotiations, the man who puffs his pipe giving little away, all the time sizing up his opposition while astutely thinking of the long game and envisaging dimensions and directions others only discern with hindsight.
This image is not been supported, however, by his Polokwane re-election miscalculation and in the one area he is supposedly both especially knowledgeable and passionate about: foreign policy.
The image and direction of South Africa’s foreign policy is today bewilderingly far removed from Nelson Mandela’s 1993 hope that human rights would be the light that guided its foreign policy, a beacon of hope for the world and for African development. Indeed, nothing would seem to symbolise President Mbeki’s failures more than the disappearance of the “African renaissance” from discourse.
In fact, it is unclear what today motivates South Africa’s leaders to take the positions they currently do in international affairs. They certainly do not appear to be stirred by a clear understanding of South Africa’s national interest. Few calculations appear to be actively made to balance interests between ideological priorities and the country’s needs of trade, investment and international influence.
Take Pretoria’s role in the United Nations (UN) and voting tactics in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), where short-term tactical politicisation routinely overshadows strategic considerations.
This is a continental malaise. Africa has the biggest voting bloc in the UN, WTO and other such bodies. But what does South Africa and the continent ‘trade’ its votes for? Help to Cuba and the Palestinians, blocking UN managerial reform, obstructing the interests of Western powers, and manoeuvring around tougher action on Burma and Iran. None of this does one bit for Africa or Africans, outside of the New York diplomats who revel in such posturing or those leaders overwrought by their own anti-colonial complexes. Africa is often the subject of these meetings, but its leaders generally miss the point.
As the collapse of the global trade talks shows, the WTO is perhaps the worst example. Led by Pretoria, 40 African votes were locked together with China, India and Brazil, with the aim of resisting European and American demands for the South American and South Asian giants to open their markets. Fine for them, but those same countries have as high or higher tariffs on African goods as the European Union (EU) does, and much higher than the United States (US). If African votes in support of their positions had been exchanged for commitment from those countries to provide duty- and quota-free status to Africa (a small price for them to pay given the limited share Africa would gain in their markets), this position would make sense. Instead Africa has sold its votes for some form of South-South solidarity without any return serving its own interests. India, China and Brazil must have laughed all the way to Geneva for every Doha session.
Imagine if the Africans – led by South Africa – were to use their votes as strategically as the Eastern Europeans did brilliantly in their campaign for membership of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the EU? For example, by helping on more balanced Middle East resolutions in the General Assembly, Africans could gain more concrete US support for peacekeeping operations in Darfur and Somalia, and by helping trim the UN budget waste they could receive more assistance for their own specific development needs.
Take another topical example: Zimbabwe. Mr Mbeki has rhetorically attempted to restore normality to Zimbabwe’s politics by encouraging Mr Mugabe down the path of electoral politics. There is nothing inherently wrong with that, even though it has amounted to too little too late in the day of hyper-inflation, ratcheting state violence by Harare, and a disintegrating social order.
Following the failure of the electoral route and Pretoria’s role in heading off a tightened UN sanctions regime against Harare, Mbeki has tried to fulfil his Southern African Development Community (SADC) mandate and negotiate an end to the worsening crisis through creating a unity government. In the face of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change’s (MDC’s) victory in the 29 March 2008 election, Mr Mbeki has thus appeared to be more interested in the welfare and dignity of Zimbabwe’s leader and his ZANU-PF party cohort than in the country’s people. No wonder, then, that Zimbabweans, among others, are angered by the South African president’s role:
“‘If Mbeki thinks he can arm-twist Zimbabweans into accepting his own formula for peace, he has got another think coming. We are Zimbabweans, Mr. Mbeki. This is not a Limpopo Province. When we say we want democracy in Zimbabwe, we do not stop with half measures.”
Or, as the South African Sunday Times observed:
“Forcing Tsvangirai to accept Mugabe as the executive president of a government of national unity might be a first step towards peace for millions of people, but it would signal to the world that the uniquely African democracy we profess to seek is no democracy at all.”
Even if Mbeki’s peace solution, signed on 15 September 2008, holds, his role can only be judged an overall failure, unless, of course, the aim was only to keep the MDC and Mr Tsvangirai from rightfully taking power. Pretoria’s pathological unwillingness to act over the past decade against Mugabe – if only to say what was happening there was wrong – has allowed the crisis to develop to today’s point of meltdown. This has produced a disastrous economic legacy which experience elsewhere in Africa teaches will take at least as long as the period of decline to undo.
Mbeki’s failings on Zimbabwe have partly also been about poor tactics: given that Pretoria has spurned the contemplation of tougher measures (and indeed actively sought to head them off in the UN), it left itself only with a bag of carrots and imploring rhetoric. Hence the minimal leverage over Mr Mugabe in convincing the octogenarian not to hang on to executive power at Zimbabweans’ expense. And from steadfastly maintaining the need for Zimbabweans to sort the crisis out themselves and thus to do nothing, Mr Mbeki said in August 2008 he was willing to stay in Zimbabwe for six months to ensure a deal was struck (see here). Mbeki’s long-held opinion that quiet diplomacy was the only way to retain influence over Harare has proven as false as it was ideologically self-serving. After all, what influence, and to what end?
The reasons for this partly lie in Mbeki’s misunderstanding of Mugabe, a man who has continuously played Pretoria’s Machiavelli like a fiddle. ZANU-PF has been shown, historically and today, to have few moral scruples when it comes to getting into or staying in power. When real political change comes – as it inevitably will since the (freefall) Zimbabwe economy demands it – it will have had little to do with Mbeki’s role.
Such foreign-policy directions likely also relate to an ideological unease with the professed libertarian precepts of South Africa’s economy, which has resonance elsewhere across the continent. While the debate on African political systems is largely settled (with exceptions) in favour of liberal democracy, the discourse on economics is less certain, hence the absence of widespread criticism by African leaders of Mr Mugabe’s economic policies per se, even if there is concern for their meltdown effects. Where not openly visible, the desire to indigenise African commerce lies just beneath the surface, and not only in Zimbabwe.
South Africa’s foreign-policy choices are also partly linked to an at times barely disguised sentiment of anti-imperialism, applying to the West (and not to Russia’s or China’s imperialistic ambitions) and its apparent arch-progenitor, the United States. This view is allowable, of course, providing it does not lead to bad choices, such as Pretoria’s failure to negotiate a free-trade agreement with the United States, or to forego the aforementioned UN targeted-sanctions option against Harare. The barely disguised glee – schadenfreude – that permeates Pretoria’s corridors and the mindset of its mandarins, and lies behind analysis of the US economy or its role in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, overlooks the centrality of the US to the global economy – around one-quarter of the world’s gross domestic product at last count. The self-righteous antipathy towards US foreign policy seems to forget that Washington is most often the first port of call for those in peril – and that the current Bush administration has been the most generous ever to African aid and other development endeavours. Mr Mugabe has crudely if skillfully played to this sentiment, one which resonates across Africa (if decreasingly in Zimbabwe itself), by accusing Mr Tsvangirai’s MDC of being the candidate of resurgent Western imperial interests.
And the puzzle of Mbeki’s foreign policy is partly down to the related liberation narrative of the African National Congress (ANC).
From his Zimbabwe actions, it would appear that Mr Mbeki’s ANC wants South Africa to be seen both as a liberator and as the liberated: a country attempting to reinforce the party’s credentials from its anti-racist and anti-imperialist struggle. The paradox is, of course, that protecting the party’s self-image and perpetuating liberation narratives too often trumps doing the right thing: witness Pretoria’s support for dictatorships over democracy. It has exposed the government’s weakness and sensitivities on questions of race in its reactions to the involvement of other powers in even commenting on Zimbabwe. It also perpetuates the Sinatra mythology of South Africa’s own negotiations: that South Africans, led by the ANC, did it “their way” with little outside interference or involvement, conveniently overlooking the role of sanctions or the existence of a rational domestic negotiating partner. Viewed through this prism, the MDC and ZANU-PF were similarly to sort out their own differences by themselves – the view perpetuated until Mr Mbeki came under pressure from more resolute SADC members this year. Combined with Zimbabwe’s economic collapse to a Weimar-style situation of hyper-inflation measured in hundreds of million of percent annually, this, not Mr Mbeki, acted as leverage on Mr Mugabe. He might have been able to regularly rig his country’s elections, but the octogenarian could not rig his economy.
There has been, until now, little international cost to all of this. For the moment, the world is preoccupied with making peace in Iraq and Afghanistan, dealing with issues of nuclearisation and with faltering economies, and other erupting crises such as the Russian-Georgian conflict. So Pretoria gets, for the most part, a free pass, even though its hand-holding with Harare, Teheran, Rangoon and others at the very least dims the sparkle of its once-considerable foreign reputation. In the immediate term, all of this makes ridiculous Pretoria’s apparently earnest attempts over the past decade to negotiate an end to the Israeli-Palestinian impasse.
There will be other prices to pay for cosying up to autocrats. These will be paid in the image South Africa has as a reliable international partner, and in the poisoning and enfeeblement of SADC and, to some extent, the African Union. It will also have costs in terms of the strength of the South African nation, given that today a large body of citizens, from the Congress of South African Trade Unions to important sections of the business community, cannot identify – and do not benefit materially from – Pretoria’s foreign line.
For ultimately the strength and influence of any foreign policy derives fundamentally from a country’s success as a society at home, from determining what sort of society it wants to be, and acting that way. Economic power is one aspect; for South Africa, the deeper one relates to its ability not only to want to appear an inclusive, non-racial democracy, but to act that way. Such values, if they are to have any meaning and South Africa any persuasive “soft” power, have to be upheld consistently and without fear or favour, at home and abroad.
Pretoria’s support for rogues is therefore unlikely to assist its own efforts to provide security and development for all South Africans, the first aim of any responsible government. Nor is it likely to assist its aspirations to strengthen global governance through the UN; indeed, it may have the opposite effect by alienating the big spenders. And it is unlikely to assist Pretoria in gaining a place at the main table, such as a permanent UN Security Council seat.
The only benefit Pretoria’s foreign-policy behaviour can give currently is comfort in the minds of its ideologues by preserving for a little longer the mythology of sections of the party, its personalities, its politics and its place in history. As long as it remains locked into this position, it will be difficult to change the attitude that it is not worth talking seriously to South Africa. It is in South Africa’s national, moral and material interest to hasten this era’s closure, not to sustain it, and to develop and deploy the tools, skills, systems and institutions capable of pursuing a foreign policy worthy of the country’s name, status and assets.
Theodore Roosevelt observed to the Harvard Union in 1907 that “[i]n popular government results worth having can be achieved only by men who combine worthy ideals with practical good sense”. Results are at the outset all about leadership. Given the wrong, narcissistic sort, and the related stocking of key foreign-policy institutions, as with the departments of both Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry, with below-par hacks apparently capable of little apart from toeing the presidency’s line, Pretoria will make little progress in its ambitions to improve the lot of South Africans through its foreign-policy actions. It cannot do so, also, if there is an environment where criticism is perceived as dissent, and where the hallmark of government, and utility of civil society and the media, resides for the presidency in their unswerving and uncritical loyalty.
But for a new ANC administration in Pretoria, the reverse also holds true. If it can do this, Mr Mbeki’s departure from office could light up South Africa’s foreign policy stage. - Politicsweb
Dr Greg Mills heads the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation This article was originally published in the Helen Suzman Foundation’s journal, Focus, Issue 51 3rd Quarter, September 2008 (see http://www.hsf.org.za/)
Britain on Monday led EU nations in condemning moves by Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe to take control of key ministries in defiance of a power-sharing deal with opposition parties.
British Foreign Secretary David Miliband said the European Union would “play no part in supporting a power grab by the Mugabe regime.”
“It is important that there is an international united response that says that the results of the elections (earlier this year) need to be respected and a power grab will not be respected,” Miliband told reporters at EU talks.
Miliband said he hoped South Africa’s former president Thabo Mbeki can mediate a solution that will allow opposition groups to share power with Mugabe, as was agreed in September.
EU ministers were to issue a statement urging Mugabe and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai to work out their differences and ensure they share power. The draft statement said it was urgent for both to agree on a new government of national unity to push forward reforms and to stop the deterioration of the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe.
Tsvangirai on Sunday threatened to pull out of the national unity government if Mugabe refused to cede control of the defense, home and foreign affairs, justice, mining and land ministries.
Mugabe’s party allocated only minor ministries to Tsvangirai’s party, which won a slight majority in parliamentary elections in March.
Mugabe’s party maintains that Mbeki only needs to mediate over one outstanding ministry of finance and claims all the others are settled.
The EU has said it will keep sanctions against Zimbabwe until a power-sharing government is in place and it has met international demands for economic and political reforms, including better human rights.
The EU decided in July to increase sanctions against Mugabe’s supporters to keep up the pressure on him.
The EU has blacklisted 172 people linked to Mugabe’s government and four companies believed to financially support Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party. That list also includes Mugabe himself and members of his Cabinet, under measures passed in 2002.
All those on the list are subject to a travel ban and assets freeze.
The bloc also has frozen aid projects in Zimbabwe and imposed an arms embargo. – iht
President Robert Mugabe and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai failed to settle differences in talks on Saturday about the finance and home affairs ministries in a new Zimbabwe government.
A meeting of the two men, also attended by Arthur Mutambara, leader of a smaller faction of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), was held to try to break the deadlock over cabinet posts which threatens a power-sharing deal.
“The president and the two leaders of the MDC formations met on Sunday morning in consultation about the setting up of government but failed to conclude their consultation,” Mugabe’s spokesperson George Charamba said in a statement.
“However, they decided that there should be further consultation at the level of their negotiating teams exclusively about the ministries of finance and home affairs.”
MDC spokesperson Nelson Chamisa said the leaders had “a frank and realistic” exchange, adding: “There was deliberation but there was no agreement.”
Chamisa said: “We hope that things will be resolved soon but the delay is a threat to people’s lives. People are dying the humanitarian response has to be activated and you need a functional government to do that.”
Officials said Mugabe and Tsvangirai were expected to meet again early this week.
“This is an indication that we may get an agreement sooner than we expected,” said Lovemore Madhuku, chairperson of the National Constitutional Assembly, a political pressure group.
Talks between Mugabe’s Zanu-PF and the MDC have reached an impasse about who will control key ministries in a unity government to be established under the power-sharing deal agreed on September 15.
Weekend Argus understands that Mugabe and Tsvangirai once again clashed on the ministries of home affairs, information, finance, foreign affairs and local government.
Mugabe is said to be softening on the ministry of finance but is not moving on the others, especially home affairs which is desperately wanted by the MDC.
The MDC believes that if it takes home affairs, it will be able to disarm Zanu-PF. Mugabe’s party is aware of this and of reports that the MDC would also arrest corrupt Zanu-PF officials.
“Both Mugabe and Tsvangirai have strong reasons to be desperate for home affairs and this is creating the problem,” said a top MDC official.
A senior government official earlier declined to specify when an agreement was expected or whether there was pressure from former president Thabo Mbeki – who is mediating in the Zimbabwe crisis – to form a government.
The opposition accuses Mugabe’s party of trying to assign it a junior role in government and says only mediation can break a deadlock in talks on forming a cabinet.
Zanu-PF said it saw no immediate need for mediation and Mugabe had expressed confidence the cabinet would be named this week. – Foreign Service and Sapa-Reuters-AFP -iol
Zimbabwe once again attracted remarkable international attention in 2008, this time over highly controversial elections and protracted negotiations between Zimbabwe’s main political actors aimed at finding a resolution to the country’s political crisis. A Thabo Mbeki brokered power-sharing deal between Robert Mugabe’s Zanu-PF and the two MDC factions, led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara respectively, was finally reached on September 15 2008. Southern African Development Community (SADC) leaders celebrated. The international community’s response was lukewarm. The likes of Mbeki felt vindicated after years of bearing criticism for his “quiet diplomacy”. Others, such as hardliners in Zanu-PF and Zimbabwe’s security establishment, were disgruntled.
For many Zimbabweans inside the country, the deal was a ray of hope because life had become a punishing drudgery. A life of enduring the merciless African sun while queuing for food and a worthless national currency. The wretchedness is compounded by the breakdown of service delivery, skyrocketing inflation, the breakdown of the rule of law, the politicisation of the police, military, civil service and judiciary, and the violence meted out by the state on citizens it ought to protect.
In the midst of evident collapse and misery one would have thought that the power-sharing deal will be implemented with alacrity by the three political parties. But Zimbabwe is a difficult country politically. It has a penchant for throwing up the unexpected and many of its current problems have robust historical roots that will not be easily uprooted. It is little surprise that a deadlock has developed between the political parties over the formation of a cabinet to run the country. Zanu-PF is bent on retaining powerful ministerial posts such as state security, defence, home affairs and finance. In spite of the MDC’s majority in parliament and Tsvangirai amassing the most votes in the first presidential election round, Zanu-PF still views the MDC as a subordinate party.
The Tsvangirai MDC has called on former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, to continue with his mediation efforts in order to break the deadlock. On the other hand Zanu-PF insists that Mbeki’s mediation is not required because there is no deadlock. The contestation over Mbeki’s renewed involvement in Zimbabwe is odd. Mbeki is still recovering from the fallout of his humiliating resignation as South African president. Whether he still has the verve and authority to continue as mediator is unclear. The new South African president Kgalema Motlanthe has been quick to throw his weight behind Mbeki’s proposed continued mediation. Whether this is a reflection of his faith in Mbeki’s negotiation skills or is an attempt to duck having to deal with a difficult situation that may haunt his presidency in the manner it did Mbeki’s is also unclear.
However, the issue is less about whether Mbeki should continue in his role and the various motives at play. Mbeki’s efforts reached their peak when the power-sharing deal was signed. There is little he or any other mediator can add to the actual power-sharing process. The onus is on Zimbabwean politicians, particularly those in Zanu-PF, to show political maturity and commitment to the deal for the sake of national interest, and to foster trust and unity between each other and the nation. These qualities are rare in Zimbabwean political culture because in the place of civil dialogue there is uncivil dialogue. In the place of meritocracy there is seniority. In the place of a culture of conflict resolution there are “degrees in violence” guaranteeing particular political interests. In the place of issue-based politics there is labelling based on the extent of one’s liberation war credentials. Being the dominant nationalist party for approximately 40 years, Zanu-PF is guilty of having generated this political culture.
The result is that Zimbabwean politics has been rendered exclusive and impenetrable to those who seek to challenge the views of Zanu-PF. The party is the be all and end all and those outside of it are illegitimate. As former vice-president Simon Muzenda once noted, “If Zanu-PF puts up a baboon as a candidate, you vote for the baboon.” Other leading Zanu-PF politicians such as Nathan Shamuyarira boast unselfconsciously that “the area of violence is an area where Zanu-PF has a very strong, long and successful history”. And while individuals associated with the MDC have attempted to develop reasoned and democratic politics, both MDCs are susceptible to a politics akin to Zanu-PF’s. Opposition politics is also a habitat for violence and undemocratic practices. It too is characterised by personalised and immature politics, and contemptible invective such as the Tsvangirai MDC secretary general Tendai Biti’s public branding of rival MDC member Gift Chimanikire as a “smelly fat man who does not bath” and Chimanikire’s retort that Biti “suffered from diarrhoea”.
A melancholy truth about Zimbabwean politics is its lack of gravitas. It is rudimentary, trifling, divisive, intolerant and blind to the national interest – this is the crux of the matter, not whether Mbeki should stay on as mediator and be called in. – Guardian
The writer of this article Blessing-Miles Tendi is a researcher and freelance writer on contemporary Zimbabwean politics
With a legacy of a presidency replete with episodes of controversy, sometimes utter buffoonery and lunacy, Thabo Mbeki’s collapse is well merited. From his irritating brotherly solidarity with dictators of Zimbabwe and Sudan to deliberately misunderstanding Aids and HIV given its trail of horrors on the African continent, more so in South Africa, the people of Africa will not miss him.
Mbeki has left office at a time when Zimbabwe is at the crossroads and in a complete mess, a mess he helped to create by his collusion with Mugabe in entrenching the Zimbabwean dictatorship. Going forward, his role as mediator is completely diminished especially considering that the Morgan Tsvangirai-led MDC never trusted him in the first place.
His loyalty to Mugabe, who has caused untold suffering to his people, has been a huge source of depression and annoyance to many Zimbabweans. The true barometer of the success of his so-called ‘quiet diplomacy’ and “African solutions” should have resulted in the long-overdue departure of the octogenarian dictator.
Mbeki also shielded another mass murderer, al Bashir, the butcher of Khartoum, by fiercely calling for the suspension of al Bashir’s warrant of arrest by the International Criminal Court. Over 300 000 black Sudanese have been murdered by Sudan’s ruling Arabs and another 2.5 million displaced. I have my own misgivings about Arab racism dotted throughout history and more glaring during slavery era.
I am rattled by the mere mention of Arab dictators like Libya’s Gaddafi getting involved in black Africa issues. Mbeki and Gaddafi, backed by veto-wielding Russia and China, successfully pushed for a U.N. Security council resolution to hold off for another year any efforts to get al-Bashir prosecuted. Now that Mbeki is out of the way, that leaves Gaddafi alone for now.
The advent of the Zuma/Motlanthe administration is what Zimbabwe really needs given Zuma’s uncompromising stance on Mugabe’s dictatorship. On several occasions, Zuma has gone on record denouncing Mugabe to the extent of branding Mugabe a ‘monster’. Speaking to the Sunday Telegraph(November 28, 2006) Zuma assured critics asserting that “as a member and a leader of the ANC all I do is carry out ANC policies,” he said. “How could you have an individual who would become such a monster? The ANC system does not allow for that kind of thing.”
Mbeki, dubbed an ‘Aids denialist’ notoriously burnt candles throughout the night surfing the internet for any obscure sources that buttressed his views that questioned aids orthodoxy and science of the disease. On April 3 2002, Mbeki ‘s Health Minister (a devout member of his inner circle), went to a constitutional court seeking to overturn a judge’s order that had ruled in favor of immediately providing anti-HIV drugs to pregnant women.
As far as Aids and HIV is concerned, this is no time for apprentices to intellectualism like Thabo Mbeki, who have the luxury of behaving like retired philosophers sitting under a tree trying to figure out the meaning of life while people are dying. Sothern Africa has an emergency at hand and this is time for action.
Mbeki’s final years in power have all the footprints of political hooliganism exhibited by his troublesome compatriot up north of the Limpopo. I have no doubt that Mugabe was Mbeki’s political brain. How and when Mbeki was convinced to depart from the Mandela legacy remains a mystery. Mbeki could not resist acting in dictatorial solidarity and in unison with Mugabe. Remember last December, Mbeki futilely tried to sneak in a third term for himself at the ANC conference at Polokwane. What happened in South Africa should have happened in Zimbabwe if Zanu PF had not been privatized by Mugabe. No one in that party can dare say no to Mugabe, because the consequences are lethal.
We have also witnessed the glaring privatization of institutions meant to safeguard national interests such as th Central Intelligence Organization in Zimbabwe and the National Intelligence Agency in South Africa. These organizations lost public trust and credibility after they were reduced to mere spying apparatus on opposition/opponents. At a time the country is reeling from gangsters and violent crime, Mbeki could not even use the security apparatus to bring the country to order. It seems Mbeki never wanted to address crime in South Africa for whatever reason.
The two men also share another disturbing characteristic, that of abusing criminal justice system to disable opposition or perceived threats to their thrones. After the 2002 elections in Zimbabwe, MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai found himself facing concocted treason charges stemming from a carefully choreographed plot to kill Mugabe. Such an approach served its purpose as it distracted the opposition from fighting the outcome of the 2002 election and challenging Mugabe as an illegitimate ruler.
South Africa also finds itself in a political mess, largely a product of Mbeki’s creation, its architect. The same applies to Zimbabwe where the mess was carefully created by Mugabe. The philosophy is that you create a problem and then throw in the indispensability dimension. For instance you throw the party into chaos and then pretend to be the unifier, or that middle guy who can bring everybody together. It is loosely similar to the colonial divide and rule phenomenon. Mugabe considers himself to be the only man who can unite the country/party.
The two leaders’ excessive pre-occupation with power-schemes can help explain why the common man has been left unattended to. It is a fact that the average South African has been left worse-off since Mbeki assumed presidency in 1999 just like in Zimbabwe where the story cannot be hidden. Mass starvation is looming and has already started claiming lives in Zimbabwe. Instead a few of their henchmen and close allies have looted for themselves vast wealth aided by these leaders most notably through self-serving economic empowerment programs.
Going by Judge Chris Nicholson’s ruling that dismissed Mbeki’s sponsored charges on Zuma, it is clear that he (Mbeki) hoped to lock Zuma away in order to paralyze any chances of him ever becoming president despite the victory he had scored in Polokwane, which made him the de facto president of South Africa beginning next year. Maybe the ANC deputy president Kgalema Motlanthe , the man taking over the reigns from Mbeki will unify the party in the meantime.
On June 26 2008, as the African Union Summit in Egypt was gathering momentum, Mugabe threatened African leaders to stay out of the Zimbabwe crisis stating that “I know some people are gearing themselves for an attack on Zimbabwe. I want to see any country which will raise its finger in the AU, our elections have been free.” But it was the same Mugabe who said that a ‘mere X’ was not significant to get him to accept the outcome of the election.
It is inconceivable folly to think that Mbeki could ever defy the orders of Mugabe. Mbeki simply acted as Mugabe’s mouth-piece on numerous occasions. It comes as no surprise that the GNU deal which Mbeki helped to create is heavily skewed towards Mugabe. Mugabe is chairing national security and cabinet. If Mbeki was a true leader, he should never have aligned himself with Mugabe who has tirelessly worked to undermine democratic values in Africa.
The government of national unity deal is drawing closer to a collapse each day that passes. I sense an awful hullabaloo in the air given the suspicion with which the two camps have for each other. Mugabe could not fathom missing an opportunity to visit the West (under the auspices of attending a UN summit) which he has been denied over the years.
The UN summit comes at an opportune time for Mugabe, now that the GNU deal came out nearly as perfect as he wanted it to be. The man’s incorrigible vanity comes before country. His priorities are so misplaced that he would rather gallivant around the world shopping and pontificating on African democracy and renaissance instead of solving the country’s bleeding problems he created. I wish Zimbabweans had the spine to recall Mugabe just like what happened to Mbeki.
We also received news that the MDC National Chairman and recently elected Speaker of Parliament, Lovemore Moyo got a standing ovation and went on to thank British Prime Minister Gordon Brown saying, “You spoke for us…It is not easy to fight a dictatorship through democratic means. I dare to hope we have prevailed… We thank you for that.” My teacher taught me an important lesson: not to sing when you are still in the forest.
Whilst what he said is important, I do not think it was urgent. What is happening is a precursor to what we are about to see, a rupture of the deal culminating in a total pullout by the MDC from the unity government unless Zanu PF gets serious about solving the nation’s crisis. It will be very interesting to see how Mugabe and his men will receive this news going forward. In any case the daggers have drawn from day one starting with Mugabe’s perennial West-bashing followed by a deadlock over ministerial posts. As recent as June 26 2008, Mugabe scolded Brown as a ‘Demon’.
Zanu PF will not change its ways any time soon, given its traditional power-mongering. Its ridiculous demands to have Defense, Finance, Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs Ministry must be ignored. MDC must pull out if at least Finance and Home Affairs cannot come its way. The control of Home Affairs by MDC will partly restore our freedoms and inject accountability in the nation’s financial transactions.
The crisis that has unfolded in Zimbabwe under Mbeki’s watchful eye has made Africans a laughing stock of the world. With a frightening catastrophic social and economic meltdown, there is no doubt that South Africa is importing instability, made in Zimbabwe. It is estimated that 3 million Zimbabweans have found refuge in South Africa having fled political violence unleashed on perceived enemies of Mugabe. Others simply escaped the economic misery brought about by Mugabe and his men. Consequently, xenophobia (resoundingly the hatred of Zimbabweans) is on the rise. A few months ago a spate of xenophobic attacks left more than 60 people dead in the streets of South Africa.
Mbeki ‘s resume is not completely hollow, he has some positives. For instance his grandiose vision of African Renaissance saw him championing NEPAD initiative. He is also credited for brokering peace deals in Rwanda, Burundi, Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The South African economy has largely remained stable with evidence of economic growth, though ‘main street’ did not partake in those gains as indicated by high rates of poverty.
We should have no illusions that the Zuma presidency will come without its own set of problems given Zuma’s sometimes weird naivety. His infamous statement in court during his trial for allegedly raping a 31-year old HIV-positive aids activist left the world ’in stitches’. Zuma admitted that he took a shower in order to “minimize the risk of contracting the disease [HIV]“ and that ‘his cows were ready’ to marry the victim arguing that the so-called rape was in fact consensual unprotected sex. Both men (Mbeki and Zuma) have shown a lack of seriousness about the Aids menace.
If Zuma can exploit his populism and ability to connect with the ordinary men and women for greater good, he might very well extricate South Africa from the precariously uncertain times that lie ahead. Now that Mugabe’s last standing minion has departed, for Zimbabwe, Mbeki’s well-deserved collapse is good riddance.
Dr Paul Mutuzu is the CEO of the National Vision Institute: An independent economic and political strategy think tank focusing on Zimbabwe and the Southern Africa Region. You can visit his blog on http://nationalvision.wordpress.com/
Thabo Mbeki’s resignation as president of South Africa could hardly have come at a worse time for Zimbabwe, where he had just brokered a power-sharing deal that has now reached a pivotal — and perilous — moment, analysts say.
Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of Zimbabwe’s opposition and the prime minister-designate, said Monday that the fall of Mr. Mbeki, the region’s most influential politician, was a blow to Zimbabwe.
But he also said it was now incumbent on the African leaders who named Mr. Mbeki the mediator for Zimbabwe to ensure that the promise of the deal was fulfilled, despite the uncertainty about whether Mr. Mbeki would continue in the role.
“I think they’re aware of their responsibility to complete the negotiations,” said Mr. Tsvangirai, who spoke with serious understatement during an interview in the private study of his home here in the capital. The interview was Mr. Tsvangirai’s first since Mr. Mbeki was effectively fired by his own party just days after triumphantly concluding the Zimbabwe agreement.
Mr. Tsvangirai, 56, and Zimbabwe’s president, Robert Mugabe, 84, are at an impasse in the first crucial test of Mr. Mugabe’s willingness to relinquish some of the complete control he has exercised during 28 years in power. Mr. Mugabe did not enter negotiations until July, after African election monitors concluded that a June runoff was not free or fair and African leaders insisted on talks. He said at the signing ceremony for the agreement that he was committed to it.
When Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Tsvangirai met on Thursday, Mr. Tsvangirai said, he proposed that their parties, the governing ZANU-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, equally divide the most critical ministries, with, for example, Mr. Mugabe’s party retaining the army and the opposition taking the police. Given the broken economy, Mr. Tsvangirai said he believed that the opposition should pick the head of the Finance Ministry, but Mr. Mugabe did not agree.
“They wanted everything, all the key ministries,” Mr. Tsvangirai said.
There are signs that Mr. Mugabe, known as a canny, ruthless survivor of challenges to his authority, may be resisting genuine power-sharing. The question is whether he is still guided by the slogan he used during this year’s disputed election, still visible on posters: “This is the final battle for total control.”
Mr. Mugabe left Harare on Friday to attend the United Nations General Assembly in New York with an entourage that included his wife and son, but not Mr. Tsvangirai, who is supposed to become his partner in governing. Mr. Tsvangirai acknowledged that the authorities had yet to provide him with a passport some three months after he ran out of pages for new visa stamps, though he hopes they will soon.
When informed that the American ambassador, James D. McGee, had said the United States had issued visas for 54 people in Mr. Mugabe’s entourage, Mr. Tsvangirai let out a long whistle of amazement.
In a country where about a third of the people will be hungry and in need of food aid by next month, Eddie Cross, an official in the opposition party, was less circumspect. In a letter posted on a Zimbabwe blog, Mr. Cross wrote that Mr. Mugabe, oblivious to his people’s suffering, had simply packed his bags and departed with his entourage, “taking with them a pile of U.S. dollars to spend on 10 days of luxury and completely unproductive personal extravagance.”
More worrisome to analysts here was a vituperative column on Saturday in the state-owned newspaper, The Herald. Journalists and politicians here widely assume that the author, who used the pen name Nathaniel Manheru, was George Charamba, Mr. Mugabe’s spokesman.
The column said the power-sharing agreement had no legal force and might “collapse any day.” It said the deal gave the president the power to appoint ministers after consulting the prime minister and others. “He does not have to adopt their views,” the columnist wrote.
But Mr. Tsvangirai said that what most disturbed him was language in the column that he said promoted hatred. It described his celebratory supporters gathering as their leaders “were further swelling their already distended stomachs.” The writer mocked the opposition for its euphoria over the prospect that Mr. Tsvangirai might become prime minister as the agreement itself specified.
After an election season in which thousands of opposition supporters were beaten in state-sponsored attacks and more than 100 killed, opposition officials said they found another comment chilling. The columnist wrote that the deal’s provision for an independent audit of farms given out in an often violent land reform program “is sure to draw blood redder than the setting sun.”
Mr. Tsvangirai was careful to say that he did not believe that the author spoke for Mr. Mugabe.
Nonetheless, he added: “If what he has printed in the paper is the attitude of ZANU-PF, we might as well review our position. If that is the spirit in which we go into this marriage, it has finished before it has started.”
Mr. Tsvangirai said he regretted that ministries were not divided between the parties before he and Mr. Mugabe signed their deal, but he said he had Mr. Mbeki’s assurances that the matter would be quickly resolved.
Mr. Mbeki, however, may not be around to finish the job. Tomaz A. Salomao, executive secretary of the Southern African Development Community, which named Mr. Mbeki mediator, said Monday that the organization would not know if he would continue in that role until it was formally informed by South Africa.
The opposition has long mistrusted Mr. Mbeki, believing he was an ally of Mr. Mugabe’s and hoping his likely successor, Jacob Zuma, backed by trade unions that have rallied behind Mr. Tsvangirai, might be more effective in pushing its cause.
But in the end it was Mr. Mbeki who fashioned the deal that Mr. Tsvangirai signed. And it was Mr. Mbeki, attacked at home for a flawed legacy, who had much to gain by bringing Zimbabwe’s crisis to a peaceful end. But now with the political turmoil in South Africa, the question is whether it will be too distracted to attend to Zimbabwe’s problems.
“There is no one within S.A.D.C. of Mbeki’s stature to engage the issues and knock heads together,” said Iden Wetherell, senior editor at The Independent, a newspaper in Harare. “I can’t see Zuma, with his complete absence of diplomatic experience and lack of familiarity with Zimbabwe’s crisis, playing the same role.”
Mr. Tsvangirai said he believed that Mr. Mugabe would ultimately agree to a fair division of ministries and that regional leaders would help make that happen. “I’m very hopeful that the deal will come through and that we can start the process of rebuilding the country,” he said.
A large card displayed in Mr. Tsvangirai’s study said, “I wish a long life to my enemies so they may see all my successes.” Mr. Mugabe has certainly had a long life, but whether he will live to see Mr. Tsvangirai wield real power has yet to be settled.
Source : By CELIA W. DUGGER Published on September 23, 2008 -New York Times
The ANC seems to want President Thabo Mbeki to continue his mediation in Zimbabwe – and perhaps other African conflicts – after his resignation.
This seems to make sense as he has devoted a great deal of his presidency to continental peace-making. There are many precedents for former presidents to become peace mediators; Nelson Mandela mediated in Burundi.
But Zimbabwean political analyst Takura Zhangazha says if Mbeki does continue his Zimbabwe mediation, he would be weakened by the lack of authority of the presidency.At first glance that also sounds plausible. But, on closer inspection, what emerges as perhaps the greatest flaw in Mbeki’s peace-making efforts is that he did NOT really use the authority of his position in these endeavours.
Except perhaps in the wrong way. In the case of Zimbabwe, Mbeki’s challenge – to most observers – seemed to remove his dead hand from the power control. But Mbeki, ever the dissident thinker, seemed instead to construe his role as putting the brakes on change. He humoured, cajoled, flattered and sometimes perhaps tried to bribe President Robert Mugabe to loosen the reigns of power.
Never, it seems, did Mbeki apply pressure or invoke the relatively gigantic state he commanded to put the squeeze on Mugabe, as John Vorster had put the squeeze on Ian Smith.And so – as far as could be discerned in a very opaque negotiating processes – Mugabe mostly just accepted the flattery and did what he wanted to do anyway.
The closest Mbeki came to utilising the considerable state power at his disposal appeared to be when he offered Mugabe R1-billion to kickstart the Zimbabwean economy, on condition Mugabe introduced sensible political and economic policies. Mugabe declined and went elsewhere for the money.
Mbeki’s people argued that he had no real choice; that Mugabe was in power and only persuasion could make him surrender any of it. But that argument was undermined by a growing suspicion that Mbeki’s approach flowed from a vastly different perception of the problem.
Where others looked at Zimbabwe and saw a brutal dictator persecuting a helpless opposition, Mbeki seemed to see a weak African leader threatened by menacing Western powers, using, among other weapons, the opposition as a proxy.
So where Mbeki used his presidential powers at all, it was to protect Mugabe, not only from his international critics at the UN and elsewhere, but increasingly even from other southern African leaders.
Something similar seemed to happen during Mbeki’s brief sojourn as mediator in the civil war in Cote d’Ivoire, where he appeared to fall for dictatorial President Laurent Gbagbo’s implausible line that he was the victim of French neo-colonialist designs, using his rebel enemies as a proxy.
In the DRC and Burundi, there is also evidence to suggest that some pressure from SA on both current presidents would help to resolve lingering conflicts.
Even last week Mbeki was in Khartoum promising to help Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir avoid indictment by the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes in Darfur.
Ultimately, then, Mbeki’s African diplomacy – perhaps like his domestic politics – suffered from a touch of paranoia, an irrational fear of dark and sinister forces lurking in the shadows that blinded him to the real sinister forces out in the broad daylight.
Perhaps it would be a good idea for the Zuma people to appoint their own Zimbabwe mediator to take a fresh look at the problem.
And that he used considerable power of the South African state to ensure that Mugabe – still trying to hang on to all powerful cabinet portfolios despite signing a power-sharing deal last week – really does loosen his iron grip on power.
- This article was originally published on page 13 of The Pretoria News on September 22, 2008
Defying expectations of a breakdown in talks, Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai concluded a power-sharing agreement late Thursday night, raising hopes that the country may be moving to end its long political nightmare.
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, left, shakes hands with opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, right, ahead of talks to resolve the political crisis in the country, Harare, Zimbabwe.
EPA
“We have a deal,” opposition Movement for Democratic Change leader Tsvangirai told reporters as he emerged from a meeting with Mugabe and South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki, who has been mediating the talks. The news was certainly unexpected: Even late Thursday afternoon, Mugabe had been quoted as saying the two sides were far from agreeing on how to share power — they had been talking since a controversial June 27 runoff election, in which Mugabe ran unopposed and claimed victory after Tsvangirai, who polled more votes than the president in the first round at the end of March, withdrew in the face of a sustained campaign of violence against his supporters.
The talks had revolved around a proposal for Mugabe to remain as president while appointing Tsvangirai as prime minister — but they had been deadlocked over which of these positions would be more powerful. (Tsvangirai’s MDC also controls the legislature, having beaten Mugabe’s Zanu-PF party in the parliamentary vote in March.) It was not immediately clear what led to the breakthrough, nor how the balance of power between Mugabe and Tsvangirai will be resolved. Details of the deal are to be released Monday at a formal signing ceremony.
Neither Mugabe nor Tsvangirai is comfortable granting executive power to the other: The opposition leader demanded fresh elections, which he would be confident of winning if the poll were free and fair, while Mugabe threatened to form a cabinet without the opposition if Tsvangirai rejected his terms. Shortly before the deal was announced, one source close to the talks had said that Mbeki was on the verge of quitting his mediation role on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in frustration. “President Mbeki was fuming, threatening the Zimbabwean leaders that SADC will not be responsible if there is bloodshed in their country if they fail to reach an agreement,” said the source. “He was literally angry at the two leaders.” That may have done the trick, since the support of Zimbabwe’s neighbors is crucial to both men: If the SADC turned its back on Zimbabwe, Mugabe would be unable to govern with any stability, but neither would Tsvangirai have the leverage to oust him.
According to sources at the meeting, Mbeki, who has been in Harare since Monday in a last-ditch effort to find a compromise, offered a proposal under which Tsvangirai would serve as prime minister, chairing a council of ministers charged with formulating government policy. Under the proposal, Mugabe would remain as chairman of the cabinet, a separate entity, which would review the work of the council of ministers.
When the deal is signed finally, Mugabe will likely remain as president with two deputies from his Zanu PF party, but with reduced powers, while Tsvangirai would become prime minister with two deputies, one from his own faction of the MDC and the other being Arthur Mutambara, leader of a rival faction of the opposition party.
“There is a proposal to have a council of state which would exercise executive powers and decisions. It will be comprised of the president, his two vice-presidents, the prime-minister and his two deputies. This would effectively block Mugabe from taking unilateral decisions,” said an MDC spokesperson.
While Tsvangirai accepted the proposal, sources claimed that Mugabe had initially rejected it, saying that it would render him largely ceremonial, and insisting that Tsvangirai should instead be his deputy. A Zanu-PF minister, speaking on condition of anonymity, told TIME earlier that Mugabe was not comfortable with Tsvangirai heading the government. He said: “The deal on the table is more of a fantasy. They want Tsvangirai to chair and appoint cabinet. Those are the functions of the president in accordance to the constitution of Zimbabwe. Comrade Mugabe is refusing to sign that document.”
If, indeed, the octogenarian leader of 28 years has had a change of heart, the resulting breakthrough could open the possibility of foreign aid flowing into the country whose shattered economy has lately seen inflation top 2 million percent. But the international community, like many Zimbabweans, may wait to see whether the new deal actually ends the political violence that has become a trademark of Mugabe’s regime.- TIME
By Elisha Shamba – South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki flew to Harare yesterday in an effort to broker a long-awaited power-sharing deal between ruling Zanu PF led by President Robert Mugabe and opposition MDC led by Morgan Tsvangirai.The talks are aimed at solving the political and economic crisis facing the country.
Mbeki, who is mandated by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to mediate in the inter-party talks among Zimbabwe’s ruling ZANU-PF, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and a small faction of MDC, failed to salvage a deal between them which is supposed to lead to the formation of a unity government. But both sides involved in the talks have promised to continue the talks.
State media the Herald reported on Tuesday that Mbeki arrived in Zimbabwe with a document which seeks to resolve the outstanding issue of sharing and distributing executive powers among the parties.
The document was presented to all the parties involved during the meetings. “President Mbeki has submitted a document that looks at the executive powers and their distribution while it also looks at the structure of an all-inclusive government if the parties agree to it,” the Herald quoted a source as saying.
“The negotiators are now reviewing the mechanism presented in the document. It is an extensive and technical document,” the source said.
“The negotiators will study, debate and try to find common ground on the proposed structure of government and review the positions put forward for debate,” the source was quoted.
By the end of Monday, the negotiators from the parties failed to work out a solution to the outstanding issue and they said they would report the results of the negotiations to their principles, the Herald reported.
Prior to Mr Mbeki’s visit South Africa’s Mail Guardian newspaper reported an unnamed opposition official saying that Mr Tsvangirai would sign a deal if he was given control over the home affairs ministry. It is one of the most powerful ministries because it controls the police force.
“We want that post so that we can arrest the war veterans and the militias that go around beating up people. If Mugabe retains that post, we are in trouble [and] the violence will continue, so we won’t sign,” the official said.
President Mugabe, after the talks on Monday evening, expressed optimism by saying that although a deal had not yet been reached, the parties made much progress, according to the Herald.
“It (the meeting) was a very good meeting. We are moving forward. We are not going back (with the dialogue),” the president said.
Mugabe wants to retain control over the army and the police, to enable the ruling party to protect him and senior party members from prosecution over human rights violation linked to the disputed presidential election.
Also at the end of the talks, speaking to the media, Nelson Chamisa, spokesman for MDC led by Tsvangirai, said the negotiations would continue on Tuesday.
MDC spokesman Nelson Chamisa said the party welcomed Mr Mbeki’s arrival and expected him to play “the simple but important role of deflating the current impasse in the negotiations”.
He added: “He should persuade Zanu-PF to abandon their meaningless hardline stance . . . the people of Zimbabwe are suffering and they need a ‘pain-stop’ to come out of these talks.”
He said “we are trying to bridge the areas of our differences.”
Meanwhile a Senior Zanu PF official has this morning told Reuters that prospects for a power sharing deal with opposition MDC are remote.
“Our assessment is that they are simply trying to put spanners in the works, and they are not serious about reaching a workable power-sharing arrangement,”
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